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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
YOUNG ELECTRIC SIGN 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff & Respondent 
vs. 
JOHN R NEWBOLD dba 
STEREO VILLA, 
Defendant & Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10632 
Appeal from the Judgment of the 
Third District Court for Salt Lake County 
Honorable Leonard W. Elton, District Judge 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Appeal from order granting summary judgment on 
question of whether seller is entitled to repossess sign 
sold on conditional sale, retain payments made to time of 
repossession, resell the sign, retaining the proceeds there-
of for its own use and benefit, giving defendant no credit 
therefor, and sue for the remainder of the purchase price. 
2 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On January 18, 1966, the Honorable Joseph Jeppsoa 
judge of the district court, ordered the action dismissc 
" grantmg permission to refile an amended complaint or 
move the court to reconsider. Plaintiff filed a motion e 
reconsider which was heard before another judge of ji 
district court, Honorable Leonard W. Elton, who grant1 
summary judgment for the plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a reversal of the order of Judge Eltr 
granting summary judgment, and a reinstatement oft 
original order of dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 31, 1963, defendant purchased a sign l 
use in his business from defendant for the total price 
$277.95. See exhibit P-1 included in the record hem 
Defendant paid $100.00 down and agreed to pay the br 
ance of $177.95 in two equal monthly installments begi 
ning with the month of January, 1964, with intenoJ 
thereon at the rate of 8% per year on all past due inst8ti 
ments. Defendant defaulted in his payments immediatef 
thereafter, and has paid nothing on the contract exce 
1 
for the $100.00 down payment. Plaintiff subsequently rA 
possessed the sign and resold it. Thereafter, apparentlyL 
reliance upon the provisions of paragraph 4 of the cC 
tract which provided that in the event of default plaintc 
could remove the sign from defendant's premises "a 
retain the same and the payments theretofore ma 
thereon by the vendee for the use of said SIGN," / 1 
paragraph 6 which provided the "SIGN has no valuP: 
3 
when repossessed, suit was commenced for the full 
1soamount of the contract balance of $177.95. The matter 
;scwas brought on for pretrial before Judge Jeppson who 
>r 
n entered the following order: 
ji "The court was of the opinion that it was against 
nt1 public policy for the plaintiff to obtain the reposses-
sion of the sign, together with the full purchase price, 
and inasmuch as the defendant was not in a position 
to show that the merchandise was lawfully fore-
closed, and that the defendant was credited with the 
:e 
value of the merchandise at the time of repossession, 
the Court at Pretrial dismissed the action with per-
mission given to the plaintiff to file an amended 
complaint on or before the 28th day of January, 1966. 
In the event it is not filed, this dismissal is with 
prejudice." 
~gi The court also granted permission to bring the matter 
~non for reconsideration provided a motion for such was 
1t8riled before the said 28th day of January. A motion was 
1te 
filed and hearing thereon continued to the 19th day of 
:ce 
Y 1April, 1966 at which time it was heard before Judge 
lyLeonard W. Elton, another judge of the Third District 
cCourt who granted summary judgment for the plaintiff. 
nt(R-13) 
"a 
m Plaintiff thereafter filed his notice of appeal (R-14) 





THE HEARING BEFORE JUDGE ELTON INVOLVIM 
THE EXACT SAME ISSUES OF FACT AND LA\' 
THAT HAD ALREADY BEEN RULED UPON B' 
JUDGE JEPPSON WS IMPROPER AND CONTRAR' 
TO ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL ADMrn 
ISTRATION 
It has long been a principle of the common law th, 
courts of equal jurisdiction will not interfere with pn 
ceedings before another court or before another judger 
the same court. During the time when the law and equit 
courts were separated, equity oft times intervened in pn 
ceedings before the law courts to correct or prevent a 
injustice, but even there, such interferance was cautiorn 
ly and judiciously interposed. 
Since the merger of both the law courts and the equit 
courts into one court, it has been the practice for cour: 
of equal jurisdiction to refuse to review the actions r 
judgments of one another. The district courts of the Stat 
of Utah, of course, have both law and equity powers corr 
bined into one and the same court, and it is therefor 
improper for one division of the District Court of Sa 
Lake County to overrule or interfere in any manner wit 
the rulings of any other division. 
The Montana Court has had occasion to rule on th 
very matter, and the case of State ex. rel. Carrell· 
District Court, 50 Mont. 428, 147 P. 612, is precisely 1 
point. In June, 1912, in department 2 of the District Cou' 
in Lewis and Clark County, one Joseph J. Carrell w: 
5 
nl;pointed guardian of the person and estate of one Mary 
Mmphey, an incompetant some 80 years old. In January, 
J 915, the daughter of Mary Murphey, one Mrs. Nett, pe-
titioned to have her mother declared competent. The 
hearing was held in department 2 and the petition denied. 
A writ of habeas corpus was immediately sued out in 
behalf of Mrs. Murphey in department 1, another depart-
ment of the same court. The writ was issued, hearing held 
in department 1, and Mrs. Murphey discharged. The 
guardian, however was not relieved of his duties in re-
gard to the estate, and consequently appealed to tihe Su-
prPme Court. The order discharging Mrs. Murphey was 
overruled on the ground, among others, that the dis-
charge on the habeas corpus writ was based upon the fact 
of the competency of the respondent which fact had al-
ready been adjudicated in department 2 on the petition 
to have her restored to competency. The court said: 
"That adjudication should have ended the matter, 
except for causes arising subsequently thereto. The 
two departments of the district court are coordinate. 
Neither possesses any appellate or supervisory con-
trol over the other, and when one has spoken upon a 
matter properly before it, a due sense of propriety 
alone ought to be sufficient to stay interference by 
the other." 
"When the application for restoration was denied in 
dept. No. 2, Mrs. Nett (Mrs. Murphey's daughter) 
was forbidden by statute (Section 6324 Rev. Codes) 
the right to renew it before the other department, 
and yet if this order now under review be permitted 
to stand, she will have accomplished by indirection 
the very thing she is forbidden to do directly." 
6 
Section 6324 Rev. Codes, now 93-1101 Rev. Codes, 194 
is substantially identicle with 78-7-19, U.C.A., 1953, whic 
provides as follows: 
"REPEATED APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS FOF, 
BIDDEN - If an application for an order, made to 
judge of a court in which the action or proceeding 
pending, is refused in whole or in part, or is grantc 
conditionally, no subsequent application for the sarr 
order can be made to any other Judge except of 
higher court; but nothing in this section applies 1 
motions refused for any informality in the papers r 
proceeding necessary to obtain the order, or to mi 
tions refused with liberty to renew the same." 
The statute, of course, merely gives the force of statu! 
law to the principle as it has been observed by the cour 
for centuries, making clear, however, that mere failUJ 
of formality would not be a bar to a renewed motion l 
the same grounds. The reason for the rule is well stah 
in the case of Lutey Bros. v. Jackson, County atty., et. a 
(Montana 1918), 179 P. 459. 
"It must therefore be constantly borne in mind the 
while there may be more than one department co: 
stituting a district court in this state, it is still b: 
one court-one judicial establishment-and the a 
tion of one of the judges in a matter rightfully pen 
ing in the attachment proceeding before him co: 
tinued until the matter could be finally and cor 
pletely disposed of, and was absolute. While the o 
servance of this principle might be required l 
grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it is a ru 
essential to the dignity and just authority of eve1 
court, and its proper observance is necessary in ord1 
that unseemly and discreditable conflicts may i 
avoided." 
7 
The reLJ. uirements of judicial comity and courtesy alone 
woL!ld be enough to require a reversal of the order of 
Judge Elton in this case. Add to that the mandate of 
Statute law forbidding repeated applications to different 
judges upon the same grounds, and the proposition be-
comes inescapable. 
The statute does provide that nothing therein shall ap-
ply to motions denied with liberty to renew the same. 
This provision can only make sense if read to mean with 
liberty to renew the same before a different judge. Apart 
from statute, the common law has forbidden repeated 
applications, even to the same judge, on the same grounds 
once a ruling has been had on the merits. Even before 
the same judge a motion to be renewed must be based 
upon a new state of facts or conditions, or upon excus-
able neglect of the moving party to present the facts as 
they were at the original hearing. See 60 C.J.S. Motions 
and Orders, Section 44 et. seq. 
In the instant case no new matter of fact or of law was 
1 alleged or argued before Judge Elton. In fact the motion 
1 as submitted (R-10, 11) recited that "Said motion shall 
be based on the pleadings of the parties hereto and the 
1 Law of Contracts." This, of course was the very ground 
1 upon which the motion was argued in the first place be-
fore Judge Jeppson. 
8 
POINT II 
THE PURPORTED JUDGMENT OF JUDGE ELTm 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFI 
IS INVALID FOR THE REASON THAT THE ORIG 
INAL ORDER OF JUDGE JEPPSON DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WAS NEVER V ACATEI 
OR SET ASIDE. 
The pretrial order dated January 18, 1965, signed b: 
Judge Joseph Jeppson states that "the Court at Pretria 
dismissed the action with permission given to the plain 
tiff to file an amended complaint on or before the 28tl 
day of January, on or before the 28th day of January 
1966. In the event it is not filed, this dismissal is wit) 
prejudice." The court then granted permission to argui 
a motion to reconsider provided said motion were file( 
before the said 28th day of January. Pursuant to motior 
filed January 27, 1966, the matter was reheard befon 
Judge Elton and summary judgment given plaintiff. 
As a matter of good practice, and in order to avoid con 
fusion the court must vacate a prior order before enter 
ing a new or different order pertaining to the same sub 
ject matter. As the record now stands, the plaintiff's corn 
plaint was dismissed with prejudice and the same plain 
tiff later granted summary judgment on the complain 
that had been previously dismissed. No order vacatin 
or setting aside the dismissal was ever entered. For th1 
reason the order of summary judgment should be n 
versed and the matter remanded to the district court fo 
rehearing before the proper judge. 
9 
POINT III 
IJUBLIC POLICY, PRINCIPLES OF COMMON LAW 
' AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE UNIFORM SALES 
ACT REQUIRE THE PLAINTIFF TO MAKE HIS ELEC-
TION--RESCIND THE SALE AND RETAKE THE 
SIGN; CONFIRM THE SALE AND SUE FOR THE PUR-
CHASE PRICE; OR RETAKE THE SIGN, SELL IT FOR 
THE BEST POSSIBLE PRICE REASONABLY OB-
TAINED AND CREDIT DEFENDANT WITH THE NET 
AMOUNT RECOVERED. 
The law of sales, both under the common law, and the 
Uniform Sales Act clearly dictates a reversal of the order 
granting summary judgment in this case. The case of 
I.X.L. Stores Co. v. Moon (1916), 49 U. 262, 162 P. 622 is 
a case decided one year prior to the adoption of the Uni-
form Sales Act in Utah, and is exactly in point with the 
instant case. In that case the plaintiff had sued on two 
1 notes given in connection with a conditional sale con-
1 tract. About 30 days after the goods were sold and de-
livered to the defendant he became convinced he could 
not pay for them, called the plaintiff and asked them to 
take the goods back. Plaintiff thereupon took all of the 
said goods and sued for the full purchase price upon the 
notes. The trial court gave judgment as a matter of law 




The court stated the question involved thusly: 
"What are the legal rights of a vendor of personal 
property as against the vendee in case the vendor 
retains the title of the property until the purchase 
price is fully paid and in case of default of payment 
of the purchase price, or any part thereof, the vendor 
10 
repossesses himself of the property which is the sub-
ject of sale, either with or without the consent of 
the vendee ?" 
In answer to the question the court stated: 
"We are clearly of the opinion when the plaintiff, 
although at the request and with the consent of the 
defendant, unconditionally repossessed itself of the 
property which was the subject of the conditional 
sale and retained the same, it waived any other rem-
edy that it might have had under the contract, and it 
is now precluded from maintaining an action upon 
the notes or for the purchase price of the goods. The 
court, therefore, committed no error in its conclusion 
of law and in entering judgment for the defendant ... 
"Of course the vendor cannot take two bites out of 
the same cherry. He may not with one hand treat 
the contract as rescinded, and retake the goods, and 
with the other treat it as in force, and sue on it as 
subsisting and recover full compensation for its 
breaches without even offering to give credit for rea-
sonable value of the goods taken and repossessed. As 
the authorities say, he may not have the goods and 
at the same time the full purchase price. That, in 
effect, it what the appellant claims, and that is what 
we say and decide he may not do . . . Here the ap-
pellant chooses, unconditionally, to retake and re-
possess, and then also seeks to enforce the contract 
and recover full compensation thereon as though 
there had been no retaking. He may not do that." 
(Emphasis added) 
The court cited and relied upon the following texts and 
authorities: I Mecham on Sales, sections 615; 616 Cyc 
896; Parke v. White River L. Co., 101 Cal. 37, 35 P. 441 
(wherein the California court stated that "the plaintifl 
could either recover the property or sue for the purchase 
11 
price. But the pursuit of one remedy necessarily excluded 
the other. It (the plaintiff) was not entitled both to the 
purchase price and the property."); Bailey v. Hervey, 135 
Mass. 174; Butler v. Hildreth, 5 Mete. (Mass.) 49; Frisch 
v. Wells, 200 Mass 429, 86 N.E. 775, 23 L.R.A. (N.S.) S 
144; Holt Mfg. Co. v. Ewing, 109 Cal 353, 42 P. 435; Smith 
v" Barber, 153 Ind. 322, 52 N.E. 1014. For other cases on 
this point see Sales, Key No. 479 (11), Sales, Cent. Dig. 
Section 1431. The above case is typical of the many juris-
dictions requiring the seller to make his election, and 
denying him the opportunity to pursue mutually ex-
clusive remedies. Plaintiff in the instant case must either 
( 1) sue for the purchase price, in which case he is re-
quired to redeliver the sign; (2) rescind the sale and take 
the sign back unconditionally; or (3) retake the sign, 
resell it for the buyer's account, credit him with the net 
amount realized, and sue for the difference between the 
market value (most likely evidenced by the price ob-
tained from a reasonable attempt to sell at a fair price) 
and the contract price. In any event, the seller cannot re-
take the sign unconditionally, which amounts to a rescis-
sion, and at the same time sue for the full purchase price. 
78 C.J.S., Sales Section 389 states: 
"Where the seller has once elected his remedy, he 
may not thereafter elect, resort to, or pursue another 
and inconsistent one." 
"The seller may not pursue two inconsistent rem-
edies at the same time, either in the same action or 
in different actions, and, where he has once elected 
his remedy, he may not thereafter elect, resort to, 
or pursue another and inconsistent one." 
In the case of Bresslin - Griffitt Carpet Co. v. Asador-
12 
ian, Mo. App., 145 S.W.2d. 494 as quoted in 78 C.J.S., 
l 
10 note 17, it was held that: 
"Where a portion of goods which had been sold an 
delivered, was returned to the seller, the seller coul 
refuse to accept the goods and sue for the full pu: 
chase price, accept the goods at the invoice price ar1 
so credit the buyers account, or sell the goods fl 
the buyer's account at the best price obtainable an 
sue for the difference between the proceeds of SU( 
sale and the invoice price of the goods." 
Section 60-4-2, U.C.A., 1953 provides the remedil 
available to the unpaid seller: 
" ( 1) Subject to the provisions of this title, notwitt 
standing that the property in the goods may hm 
passed to the buyer, the unpaid seller of goods,: 
such has: 
(a) A lien on the goods or right to retain them f1 
the price while he is in possession of them. 
(b) 
( c) A right of resale as limited by this title 
( d) A right to rescind the sale as limited by th 
title. 
This section, outlining the remedies available to tt 
unpaid seller clearly limits him to the above altemativi 
as limited by 60-4-9 (When and how resale may be madf 
and 60-4-10 (When and how seller may rescind the sale 
Plaintiff obviously has not chosen to rescind the sale, ar 
the only remedy available to him against the goods is' 
exercise his right of lien or of resale, either of which r 
quires a sale of the goods and credit to the buyers a 
count. 
13 
ApJrt from the rights against the goods outlined by 
d1apter 4 of the U.C.A. as discussed above, the seller 
would have an action for breach of contract as provided 
for in chapter 5. 60-5-1 (1) provides that an action may 
1: be maintained for the price where the property or title 
n to the goods has actually passed to the buyer. This pro-
vision is not applicable to the instant case for the reason 
n that the sign was sold under a title retaining contract, 
and defendant never received title to the goods. Conse-
quently 60-5-1 (3) delimits the seller's rights as follows: 
tt 
"Although the property in the goods has not passed, 
if they cannot readily be resold for a reasonable 
price, and if the provisions of section 60-5-2 ( 4) (pro-
viding for action where the goods have not been ac-
cepted) are not applicable the seller may offer to 
deliver the goods to the buyer, and, if the buyer re-
fuses to receive them, may notify the buyer t!hat the 
goods are thereafter hold by the seller as bailee for 
the buyer. Thereafter the seller may treat the goods 
as the buyer's and may maintain an action for the 
price." 
h Section 60-5-2 provides for resale and credit where t!he 
goods have not been accepted, and under 60-5-1 (3) the 
only condition upon which plaintiff could retain the goods 
tt as he has done here, without resale is where they are not 
Vi readily resalable, and even there he must stand ready to 
lf deliver when the price is paid. Evidence in the instant 
:e case would show that the sign was readily resalable, was 
ir in fact resold, and that the seller has in all ways since 
; ' repossession, regarded the sign as his own property and 
r not that of the buyer. The whole tenor of the law, both 
a at common law, and under the Uniform Sales Act con-
templates that the goods are to be resold and credit given 
14 
to the buyer for the price obtained. The Utah court in 
Holland-Cook Mfg. Co. v. Consolidated Wagon & Ma. 
chine Co., 49 U. 43, 161 P. 922 held that the measure of 
damages, in an action by the seller to recover the price 
of the goods sold, is a matter of general law. The plaintiff 
in the instant case utilized the conditional sales agree. 
ment as a security device for the payment of the purchase 
price. Under the conditions extant in this case he is not 
entitled to retain his security, resell it for a substantial 
price, and still hold the defaulting buyer for the full pur-
chase price. 
Ploinnff, even under general contract law would be 
required to do all that he reasonably could to avoid or 
mitigate his damages. See Stimpson on Contract 1954 
edition, page 538. Nor is a penalty, even though provided 
for in the contract recoverable. Stimpson on Contract p. 
534. 
The court, in granting summary judgment for the 
plaintiff had to have relied on the provisions in para· 
graphs 4 and 6 of the conditional sale contract. Pam 
graph 4 if applied to the facts in this case constitutes ' 
forfeiture which neither the law nor equity will allow 
If the provisions of paragraph 4 were merely an attempt 
to determine damages in advance, and the attempt wa: 
reasonable, it could be sustained on that ground, but that 
is a matter of fact to be determined by the court and tht 
jury at trial, and cannot properly be disposed of by mean 
of a summary judgment. 
Paragraph 6, on the other hand is an attempt to deter 
mine in advance what the evidence will be. The fact tha 
the parties stipulated that the sign has no value if r€" 
15 
po:.;scssed should be considered by the court or jury in 
;u 1·ivmg at the damages to be awarded; but again, it is 
not conclusive, and should be submitted along with other 
evidence. This is especially true in this case where the 
evidence would show that the sign was in fact resold for 
a substantial price, which fact, contrary to the statement 
in the agreement, more properly establishes the market 
price for the sign which is the only criterion upon which 
to base additional damages. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing, it is evident that the order grant-
ing judgment to the plaintiff should be reversed, the 
order of dismissal previously granted should be rein-
stated, and the matter remanded to the district court of 
further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD C. BARKER 
Attorney for Appellant 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
